Demo library GA 4.13.4
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Containing a compromised agent: Gravitee holds when the prompt fails

A prompt-injected agent can be stopped at the gateway, because an MCP tool list, per-person authorisation rules and a kill switch refuse its calls before any tool runs

Pre-release build Internal only

Say while it plays

  1. Over the open connection the injected delivery note got all three calls through with 200s (export the customer manifest, a £4,000 credit note, purge delivery history), because the assistant holds the API key and the allowed-tool list only sits in its prompt.
  2. Through the MCP proxy the same note is refused two ways: the MCP ACL leaves purge off the tool list, and the authorisation policy forbids export and the credit note for that person. A Forbid overrides any Permit added later by mistake, and every decision is logged with the policies that matched.
  3. The refund ceiling is £100 for Sofia, so £101 flips to Forbid, and an amount that is text, missing, negative or named twice is refused as too big. Tariq's agent was rate limited at 12 requests per 20 seconds per person, and Stop on the proxy turns the whole MCP off.

Don't claim

  • The recording says this does not stop a model being fooled: it stops the fooled model's calls reaching the tools.
  • The backend is mocked, so no customer data was exported and nothing was really credited or purged.

Chapters

  • Intro & Threat Overview
  • Applying Gravitee MCP Proxy Enforcement
  • Role‑Based Policies & Access Explorer
  • Policy Simulator & Dynamic Limits
  • Monitoring, Rate Limits, Kill Switch & Wrap‑Up
  • Call to Action

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